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The current importance of the multinational corporation's role in
global commerce is well-established. A recent study by the Organization of
American States (OAS) has projected that by the end of the 1980's, seventy-
five percent of the world's business will be conducted by as few as 300 mul-
tinationals, based predominately in the United States.' The emergence of
these corporate mammoths, whose planning and operations are conducted
on a global scale, is having an increasing effect on the international business
structure, changing the traditional patterns of global commerce.
Until the first half of this century, business negotiation in the inter-
national market was marked by the efforts of parties with conflicting in-
terests to develop a mutually beneficial agreement on the terms of transfer
of goods and capital. With the rapid growth of direct foreign investment af-
ter the Second World War,2 spearheaded by multinational corporations,
concerned host-country governments sought to establish controls to develop
a climate in which multinationals would collaborate with them in the pur-
suit of their developmental goals.3
In transactions between multinationals and their subsidiaries abroad,
the buyer-seller relationship tends to fade since the parties are elements of
the same corporate entity. Negotiation between conflicting points of view
does not take place; instead, we see a decision-making process, the purpose
of which is to effectuate the entire entity's global strategy of production and
*Director General of The National Registry on the Transfer of Technology, Mexico, Professor
of Law, Universidad Ibero-Americana, Mexico City.
1. OEA, El marco jurtdico de las empresas multinacionales, OEA/Ser.K/XXI.l;
CIDIP/2 (1973), reprinted in 14 Revista Derecho de ]a Integraci6n 243, 251 (1974). These
figures can also be found in Vagts, The Global Corporation and International Law and
Economics, 6 J. Int'l L. Econ. 247, 249 (1972). For the different investment trends according to
countries and regions see: UNCTAD, Prbcticas Comerciales Restrictivas, TD/ 122/Supp. 1. Jan.
7, 1972, at 16-53. As for the role of U.S. corporations in international trade, the author con-
siders that they represent the most important sector of world investment. The following quota-
tion is illustrative:
In the global process of expansion of foreign private investment, U.S. capital and its
corporations with international activities have played a fundamental role; U.S. capital
abroad had a sensible increase, being in 1968, 63 per cent of global private investment.
While in 1959 American investment was considered to be 11,500 million dollars, in
1968 this amount was increased to 64,800 million dollars.
B. Septilveda and A. Chumacero, La Inversi6n Extranjera en Mexico, Fondo de Cultura
Econ6mica, Mex. (1973), at 9.
2. For a comprehensive study of the origins and development of multinational corpora-
tions and their activities, see U.N. ESCOR, Las Corporaciones Multinacionales en el Mundo,
reprinted in 23 Revista Comercio Exterior 1081 (1973); Vernon, The Multinational Corporation,
5 At. Community Q. 553 (1968).
3. See F. Vicufia, El Control De Las Empresas Multinacionales (1973).
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growth. A new kind of operation in international trade has appeared which
mandates regulation by either national or international law in a way which
contributes to the developmental interests of the host-country and the well
being of its people.'
The problem is that the present national and international legal systems
have been unable to cope with this new method of corporate activity.
Typical legislation in several countries seems to treat the multinational cor-
poration as a type of business organization ruled by past commercial
realities. Thus, this new method of doing business has been regulated ac-
cording to the different areas it affects, rather than as a single phenomenon
requiring a global and unified treatment. Eduardo White has said, "While
corporations have become international in the course of a few decades, the
legal system has remained in its substance the expression of each national
policy." 5 The need to change the norms and principles applicable to these
new entities is evident and urgent, and host-countries are beginning to react
in a remedial fashion toward regulation of the multinational corporation.
The need for the legal structure to adapt its provisions to the current
circumstances of world trade is now under serious contemplation by the af-
fected nations. This is a reaction which does not distinguish the poor coun-
tries from the rich; it is a trend in developed and developing countries alike
to do something about the enormous power and wealth that multinationals
can attain which enables them to threaten the sovereign rights and powers of
States to guide their economies toward the achievement of a more favorable
climate for their citizens.
The differences between the governments of developed and developing
nations involves the choices of instruments and programs which are
available to control and supervise the activities of multinationals.
Developed countries provide examples of national measures that can
and have been adopted toward this end. In the United States, several at-
tempts have been made by the courts to extend antitrust legislation to the
foreign activities of U.S. corporations. 6 This, however, has not been as suc-
cessful as might have been expected, and recently there has been a proposal
requesting the U.S. Congress to modify antitrust legislation in order to ex-
tend its scope of application to foreign activities of U.S. business enter-
prises.7
At a regional and international level, developed nations have made at-
tempts to formulate International Codes of Business Conduct. In 1976, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
4. OEA, supra note 1, at 252. See also G. Steiner & R. Canon, Multinational Corporated
Planning (1966).
5. E. White, Empresas Multinacionales Latino Americanas, at 21 (1973).
6. See United States v. Watchmakers Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See
also Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978). For a more detailed explana-
tion of cases dealing with extraterritorial application of law, see UNCTAD, supra note 1, at
96-104.
7. See Business Week, March 14, 1977, at 100, 102.
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adopted a "Declaration on International Investment and Multinational En-
terprise," which included recommendations that multinationals not engage
in restrictive practices; that they refrain from paying bribes and other illegal
conduct; that they consider the host country's general policies, objectives,
and priorities for economic and social progress in addition to industrial and
regional development; and, among other recommendations, that they
cooperate with host governments, providing them with relevant information
concerning corporate operations! These guidelines, however, are strictly
voluntary. Further, they apply only to foreign investments made within the
territories of the OECD member countries, and are not for implementation
in developing countries.9 OECD countries are therefore the ones to be
benefited by such provisions, which leave beyond their scope the most dif-
ficult problems of private foreign investment, which are usually found in
developing countries.
The already established legal framework of developing countries with
respect to these matters has been characterized as passive, inefficient, and
unable to cope with the new phenomenon. It is in more recent years that the
need has arisen to implement stricter controls on multinationals.
In developing countries there is a very clear trend toward establishing
controls over the activities of multinational corporations which promote
their participation in the achievement of national objectives regarding the
processes of development. These goals, among others, include rapid
economic growth, industrialization in the direction of import substitution,
and decentralization of industrial facilities with an eye toward less
developed areas. This type of governmental action is exemplified by Mex-
ico's recently established law on foreign investment.
From the point of view of developing countries, the traditional legal
framework applicable to business transactions must be modified to include
new provisions dealing directly with multinational operations. Until now
these countries have been confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand is
the urgent need for resources and capital to be transferred from abroad; and
on the other hand, the fear that these powerful economic centers, which
claim no national ties, may harass and impair legitimate national develop-
ment and achievement of socio-economic objectives.'0
The new policy of developing countries towards multinational invest-
ment can be summarized as follows:
(1) The transfer of resources is not only admissible, but welcomed,
when its purpose is to accelerate and promote development adapted to the
host's laws and national economic and social policies;
8. GAO report to Congress, Nationalization and Expropriation of U.S. Direct Private
Foreign Investment: Problems and Issues. GA1.13:ID-77-9, at 21.
9. Decree in Djario Oficial [hereinafter cited as D.O.], July 20. 1972, re: Incentives for In-
dustrial Enterprises covered in Decree of Nov. 23, 197 1.
10. See Soberanis, Necesidad de Formulas un C6digo Internacional de Conducta en Materia
de Transferencia de Technologia, 26 Revista de Comercio Exterior, at 632, 635 (1976).
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(2) host countries do not ignore the right of a foreign investor to seek a
legitimate profit, but believe that the benefit should be shared with the host
country."
The right of a country to regulate and control the transfer of resources
into its economy is an expression of its sovereign power, and it is essential
that a State exercise its perogative in that regard by directing foreign invest-
ment into those sectors of the economy where it is deemed most necessary,
and by harmonizing such investment plans and multinational decision mak-
ing with national developmental goals.
Developing countries are currently struggling to adopt two kinds of
legal measures, with appropriate sanctions. One is a strengthened national
legal structure involving stricter antitrust policies, and controls over the
transfer of resources. The other is regulation of the conduct of mul-
tinationals through an international legal order.'
2
With respect to the former, several developing countries, among them
Mexico, have recently issued legislation on foreign investments, 3
technology transfer, 4 and inventions and trademarks."l
All of these laws attempt to orient the transfer of resources toward the
achievement of developmental objectives, and national economic and social
goals.
At the international level, Third World countries are pushing hard in
the Center for Transnational Corporations of the United Nations to obtain
a legally binding "International Code of Conduct for Multinational Cor-
porations,"'" which, together with the International Code of Conduct for
the Transfer of Technology, 7 the revision talks of the Paris Convention in
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and similar instru-
ments now being negotiated in United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)I5 will provide a legal framework for controlling
the operations of multinationals under more just and equitable rules.
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries
The transfer of technology should be an arrangement whereby all par-
ties receive reasonable, equitable and reciprocal benefits. It is not a question
If. Presentation by Ing. Carlos. A. Rojas, comments on Foreign Investment and the
Transfer of Technology, XXIX Plenary Meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Businessmen's Committee
(Sept. 1974). at 2-3.
12. Soberanis, La Empresa Transnacional en el Mercado de Tecnologia. 8 Dindmica del
Derecho Mexicano 145 (1975).
13. D.O., Mar. 9, 1973.
14. D.O.. Dec. 30, 1972.
15. D.O.. Feb.10, 1976.
16. See centre on Transnational Corporations. Transnational Corporations: Material
Relevant to the formulation of a Code of Conduct. E/C. 10/18, 10 Diciembre de 1976. United
Nations, New York, 1977.
17. World Peace Through Law Center, Model Code of Conduct for Transnational Cor-
porations (1977).
18. See WIPO, Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on the Revision of
the Paris Convention, Doc. PR/GE/1/10 Geneva (Feb. 21, 1975).
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of political ideology or of excessive nationalism, but rather, a complex and
delicate commercial transaction, subject to a difficult negotiation process,
and one in which developing countries have been actively involved and will
continue to be involved as they strive to obtain the technology needed for
development on the best available terms. It is not unreasonable that these
countries seek an independent and egalitarian development through regula-
tion and control of the participation of foreigners in the economic process.
The legal measures adopted by several developing countries with regard to
the regulation of the flow of foreign technology are expressions of a world-
wide trend. This new tendency is yet another expression of the desire of the
international community to build a more just and balanced "new inter-
national economic order." Nothing in these measures is confiscatory or ex-
propiatory. 1
Annotation and discussion of specific provisions of the Mexican Law
on Transfer of Technology suggest the nature of the regulatory measures
currently being adopted by developing countries.
Article 7 lists cases in which the Registry should reject the registration
of multinationals wishing to do business in Mexico.20 Essentially, the list
refers to agreements which are either unfavorable to the national economy
19. See Report of the Task Force on Technology Transfer of the United States Chamber
of Commerce, Technology Transfer and the Developing Countries (Apr. 1977).
20. D.O., supra note 13, at art. 7, which provides: The Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce shall not register the acts, agreements or contracts mentioned in Article 2 in the follow-
ing cases:
I. When their purpose is the transfer of technology freely available in the country,
provided this is the same technology.
11. When the price or consideration does not represent the technology acquired or con-
stitutes an unjustified or excessive burden on the national economy.
1I1. When provisions are included which permit the supplier to regulate or intervene,
directly or indirectly in the administration of the transferee of the technology.
IV. When there is an obligation to assign onerously or gratuitously to the supplier of the
technology, the patents, trademarks, innovations or improvements obtained by the transferee.
V. When limitations are imposed on technological research or development by the
transferee.
VI. When there is an obligation to acquire equipment, tools, parts or raw materials ex-
clusively from any given source.
VII. When the exportation of the transferee's products or services is prohibited, against
the best interests of the country.
VIII. When the use of complementary technologies is prohibited.
IX. When there is an obligation to sell the products manufactured by the transferee ex-
clusively to the supplier of the technology,
X. When the transferee is required to use permanently, personnel designated by the sup-
plier of the technology.
XI. When the volume of production is limited, or sale and resale prices are imposed, for
domestic consumption or for exportation.
XII. When an unreasonable term of duration is established. Such term shall in no case ex-
ceed 10 years, obligatory for the transferee.
XIV. When the parties submit to foreign Courts for decision in any controversy in the in-
terpretation or enforcement of the foregoing acts, agreements or contracts. The acts, agree-
ments or contracts referred to in Article 2, which are effective in Mexico shall be governed by
the laws of Mexico.
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or to the contracting party receiving the technology concerned. Section II of
Article 7 provides the Registry with the authority to judge the fairness of,
and justification for, royalty payments which are to be made in return for
the acquisition of technology, patent, or trademark license agreements. The
provision grants the Registry administrative discretion, empowering it to
make a technical and economic appraisal of the benefits contained in the
license agreement, thus enabling it to determine the fairness of the
payments.
Undoubtedly, the technical and economic evaluation of agreements in-
volves great difficulties, in view of the diversity of existing technologies, and
the lack of regulation setting the price of a given technology. As stated to
Mexican authorities by some licensors who have been quite frank about the
situation, the price of a technology is set pursuant to what the market is will-
ing to pay for it. Further, it should be noted that the nature and scope of the
technological efforts being made in the world differ substantially from one
economic sector to another, from one company to another, and even from
one product to another. For these reasons, it is not possible to establish
general criteria for what constitutes adequate consideration, nor is it possi-
ble to set a maximum acceptable limit (such as the three percent limit ap-
plied by other governmental agencies in relation to the approval of new In-
dustrial Projects) in order to grant fiscal incentives and exemptions,' since
the setting of a maximum acceptable limit implies that in many instances the
supplier of technology, knowing that his contract will be accepted if priced
within the limit, will ask that price for his technology. What was then a max-
imum limit or maximum percentage becomes a minimum, possibly well in
excess of the value of that particular technology.2
In my capacity as Director General of the Mexican National Registry
on the Transfer of Technology, I would advise legal counselors of United
States multinationals wishing to do business in Mexico to submit their cases
to the Registry, giving it all the information that may be available, so that
the Registry can undertake an adequate evaluation. It is particularly impor-
tant that each supplier enumerate and elaborate on benefits which an agree-
ment can bring to Mexico.
The approach followed in evaluating the price of technology to Mexico
has been eminently pragmatic. The Registry is actively involved in the
negotiation process between the supplying and acquiring parties assuring
that the royalty agreed upon is acceptable to all. For this reason, it is
strongly recommended that parties concerned contact the Registry and ex-
press their points of view.
21. See D.O., July 20, 1972.
22. See Statement by then Undersecretary of Industry, Lic. Jos6 Carnpillo S~inz. before
the House of Representatives (Nov- 10, 1972), reprinted in 32 El Mercado de Valores 1239
(1972).
